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Lilicoln on Secession
The recent spate of secessionist conflicts has inspired many of us to re-
turn to the classics of political theory for moral guidance on state-
breaking. Because Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, et al. are virtually silent on
this topic, however, we look in this p^wr at the writing of Abraham Lin-
coln. Lincoln is not typically heralded for his political theory, but his
arguments on secession deserve our careful attention not only because he
was an exceptionally reflective principal in what was arguably history's
most spectacular, protracted secessionist conflict, but also because (de-
scendents of) his arguments continue to be influential.'
In this essay we critically review Abraham Lincoln's arguments
against the South's bid for independence. In doing so, we divide the arti-
cle into three sections. First we review Lincoln's ten arguments against
secession. Next we explain why none of these argun>ents is adequate.
Finally, we offer an alternative argument that we believe better justifies
Lincoln's Unionist stance.
Lincoln's Case Against State-Breaking
History records Lincoln as one of America's great political figures. He is
commonly not, however, listed among the pantheon of leading philo-
sophical lights—a contrast that presents certain problems in the search
for Lincoln's "theory of secession." Perhaps, as Plato suggests, this con-
trast reflects the necessities of both endeavors. Political greatness, after
all. is ^parent in the ability to know what sorts of arguments appeal to
'Allen Buchanan credits Lincoln as the origiDator of many of the arguments against
secession that he surveys in his excellent book, Secession: The Morality of Political Di-
vorce from Fort Sumter to Lithuania and Quebec (Boulder Westview. 1991), and Philip
Abbott reflects upon how contemporaiy liberals and communitarians might utilize Lin-
coln's various arguments in his article, "The Lincoln Propositions and the Spirit of Se-
cession," in Percy B. Lehning (ed.), Theories of Secession (London: Routledge, 1998),
pp. 182-207.
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what sorts of audiences." Yet to have a theory, in the philosophical sense,
suggests that one hold a set of ideas offering at least a good faith effon
at intemal consistency.
The ideas that Lincoln voiced and penned on secession make no
strong case for altering history's assessment of him. What, for instance,
are we to make of the claim that "[p]erpetuity is implied, if not ex-
pressed, in the fundamental law of all national governments" {IV, 252)*^
Were this true, it would foreclose any and all secessionist claims, irre-
spective of any substantive merit. Yet there is reason to doubt that Lin-
coln really wished to defend such an absolutist position. (Would he
really want to suggest that the American Colonies were unjustified in
seceding from the British, for instance?) His more common tactic was to
raise arguments that could be made for secession and then demonstrate
how in each instance they did not apply to the Southern case. The tactic
was effective in casting the widest net possible, yet it was hardly the
stuff of a "theory of secession." This fact will not concem us here. Our
principal aim in this section is simply to highlight his many arguments;
we are not concemed to place them in what would undoubtedly be a
more forgiving political context.
Before examining these positions, two historical points need to be
made. First, while Lincoln's writings span four decades, the great ma-
jority of his thoughts on secession come from a fairly short period of
time. Most of the documents to which we refer were written between the
end of 1860 and the middle of 1861. Two documents in particular play a
prominent role: his First Inaugural Speech, delivered on March 4. 1861
(a month after the outbreak of the war), and his "Message to Congress in
Special Session," delivered on July 4 of that year.
The second point is related: as Lincoln did not take an active stand
against Southem slavery until well after the war had begun (and then
only, in all probability, in response to the South's dogged military resis-
I^n Lincoln's case the skill was particularly apparent in his handling of the slavery
issue. For instance, in July of 1958 we see him urging a Chicago audience to "discard ail
this quibbling about this man and the other man. this race and that race and the other race
being inferior... and [let us] unite as one people throughout this land, until we shall once
more stand up declaring that all men are created equal" (II, 501). A scant two months
later he assures an applauding southem Illinois audience (in a debate with Stephen
Douglas) that he is not "nor ever [has] been, in favor of bringing about in any way the
social and political equality of the white and black races ... Inasmuch as they cannot so
live, while they do remain together there must be the position of supaior and inferior,
and I as much as any other man am in favor of having the superior position assigned to
the white race" (III, 145-46). (All citations from Lincoln are from The Collected Works
(New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1955); volume and page numbers are shown
in parentheses.)
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tance), the issue is conspicuously absent from the discussion of seces-
sion. Four months before taking office, Lincoln
I have labored in, and for, the Republican organization with entire confidence that when-
ever it shall be in power, each and all of the States will be left in as complete control of
their own affairs respectively, and at as perfect liberty to choose, and employ, their own
means of protecting property, and preserving peace and order within their respective
limits, as they have ever been under my administration. (IV, 141)
At his inauguration in March 1861, he put the point more directly: "I
have no purpose, directly or indirectly, to interfere with the institution of
slaver) in the States where it exists. I believe I have no right to do so,
and I have no inclination to do so" (IV, 250). The well-known irony is
that, while slavery seemed to be in the forefront of the minds of South-
em leaders, it was not the issue with which Lincoln was most directly
concerned. Far from being a matter of principle, the otnission reflected
Lincoln's understanding that any hint at abolition would surely lose the
South. As we shall argue below, the tactic was not without nroral costs.
With these historical notes in mind, we may now tum otir attention to
Lincoln's arguments, which are ten in number: two against secession of
any stripe, one against withdrawing from a republic, and seven meant
specifically to undermine the South's claim to independence. The most
sweeping objection to secession (argunient #1) was made in the follow-
ing terms: "If a minority ... will secede rather than submit, they make a
precedent which, in tum, will divide and ruin them; for a minority of
their own number will secede from them whenever a majority refuses to
be controlled by such minority" (IV, 256). Relating this point to the
Confederacy, Lincoln writes:
For instance, why may not South Carolina, a year or two hence, arbitrarily, secede from a
new Southern Confederacy, just as she now claims to secede from the present Union?
Her people, and, indeed, all secession people, are now being educated to the precise tem-
per of doing this. Is there such perfect identity of interests among the States to compose a
Southern Union, as to produce harmony only, and prevent renewed secession? Will
South Carolina be found lacking in either the restlessness or the ingenuity to pick a quar-
rel with Kentucky? QW, 256)
The argument is straightforward: allow one region to secede and you
create an environment in which secession is increasingly seen as the an-
swer to political problems. Presuming this outcome to be unacceptable,
Lincoln here effectively rules out any and all secession.
Lincoln's second objection to all secession (argument #2) was a re-
ductio that compared secession to exclusion:
If all the States, save one, should assert the power to drive that one out of the Union, it is
116 Peter Lindsay and Christopher Heath Wellman
presumed the whole class of seceder politicians would at once deny the power, and de-
nounce the act as the greatest outrage upon the State rights. But suppose that precisely
the same act, instead of being called "driving the one out," should be called "the seceding
of the others from the one," ii would be exactly what the secedcrs claim to do; unless,
indeed, they make the point, that the one, because it is a minority, may nghtfully do. what
the others, because they are a majority, may not rightfully do. {IV, 436)
Here Lincoln noted that there is no morally significant difference
between minority and majority secessions. Would things be any different
if the South constituted 49 or 51 percent of the Union, for instance ? Pre-
sumably not. Thus, there is no real difference between minority seces-
sion and majority secession, which is sometimes called "exclusion."
However, exclusion is clearly impermissible: surely everyone would
agree that it would be wrong for all of the States to exclude, say. South
Carolina from the United States, for instance. But if exclusion is wrong
and there is no morally relevant difference between minority and major-
ity secessions, then minority secession is also wrong because it is simply
exclusion by another name.
A third argument was only slightly less sweeping. Rather than barring
all secession, Lincoln argued that, at a minimum, it is incompatible or at
least unnecessary within what he called a "republican form of govem-
ment." The claim here is that the institutions of change in such a gov-
emnient—elections, constitutional amendments,"^ and even provisions
for revolution (as well as "intelligence, patriotism, Christianity, and a
firm reliance on Him" (IV, 261))—are adequate to address all conceiv-
able grievances. Indeed, such ability to accommodate is what, for Lin-
coln, gave republicanism its moral stature.
Beyond these three general arguments, Lincoln cast a much narrower
net, catching only the difficulties inherent in the Confederacy's seces-
sionist claims. In his July 4, 1861 message to Congress (three months
after the attack on Fort Sumter), he stated that
[o]ur adversaries have adopted some Declarations of Independence; in which, unlike the
"I do not deny the possibility that the people may err in an election; but if they do,
the true cure is in the next election; and not in the treachery of the party elected" (IV,
259). The point is perhaps more elegantly put in his July 4 (1861) "Message to Congress
in Special Session." in which he suggests that the United States system teaches "men that
what they cannot take by an election, neither can they take it by a war" (IV, 439).
'Whenever [the people] shall grow weary of the existing govemment. they can exer-
cise their constitutional right of amending it, or their revolutionary right to dismember it"
(IV, 260).
See preceding note. By "revolutionary right" Uncoln undoubtedly nieant that rigiit
referred to in the Declaration of Independence. Note the contradiction with the argument
mentioned earlier, that "no govemment proper, ever had a provision in its organic law for
its own termination ..." (IV, 252).
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good oJd one, penned by Jefferson, they omit tbe words "all men are created equaJ."
Why? They have adopted a temporary national constitution, in the preamble of which,
unlike the good old one, signed by Washington, they omit "We, the People," and substi-
tute "We the deputies of the sovereign and independent States." Why? Why this deliber-
ate pressing out of view, the rights of men, and the authority of the people? (IV, 438)
With this concern over the South's political philosophy in mind, Lincoln
addressed the issue of secession:
The Constitution provides, and all the States have accepted the provision, that "The
United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a republican form of govern-
ment." But, if a State may lawfully go out of the Union, having done so, it may also dis-
card the republican form of government; so that to prevent its going out, is an indispen-
sable means, to the end, of maintaining the guaranty mentioned. QV, 440)
Here Lincoln made no blanket objection to secession/ only a plea to
protect that ("republican govemnwnt") which secession threatens. That
threat was, in his mind, not just evident in the words of Southern politi-
cal philosophy; it could also be seen in the way in which contemporary
political decisions were being made:
It may well be questioned whether there is, to-day, a majority of the legally qualified
voters of any State, except perhaps South Carolina, in favor of disunion. There is much
reason to believe that the Union men are the majority in many, if not in every other one,
of the so-called seceded States. (IV, 437)
He goes on to cite the elections in Virginia and Tennessee that, given the
strong elements of coercion involved, could "scarcely be considered as
demonstrating popular sentiment" (IV, 437)/
Two distinct arguments can be seen in these remarks. One (argument
#4) is that the secession was, far from a popular uprising, a movement
co-opted by elites and therefore illegititnate from a republican (to con-
tinue in Lincoln's vernacular) standpoint. Lincoln is here emphasizing
that the legitimacy of secession requires, among other things, that a ma-
jority of those in the seceding region freely support the separatist move-
ment.
The second argument (argument #5) concerned the ultimate outcome
of the separation. As the Confederacy's documents cast doubts on its
desire to create a consent-based government, Lincoln viewed the Con-
'Taken out of context, this passage could be read as a blanket objection in the sense
that no government could ever guarantee that the seceding region would maintain a re-
publican form of government. Given that the remarits come in the context of Lincoln's
very specific arguments about Southern threats to republican government, a "conditional"
inteqiretation of the passage seems to make more sense.
"At such an election, all that large class wbo are, at onoe/or tbe Union and against
coercion, would be coerced to vote against tbe Union" (IV, 437).
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federate separatist movement with suspicion because he worried that
they were poised to create an unjust (because non-republican) form of
govemment that would thereby violate the rights of its free (i.e., non-
slave) constituents.
Lincoln's third objection to the South's separation (argument #6) was
that it was contractually obligated to remain in the Union. Lincoln him-
self did not believe the United States should be thought of as merely a
contract. For the sake of argument, however, he was willing to think of it
as just that. In his mind, this raised the following question: "[I]f the
United States be not a govemment proper, but an association of States in
the nature of a contract merely, can it, as a contract, be peacefully un-
made, by less than all the parties who made it?" His answer was une-
quivocal: "One party to a contract may violate it—break it, so to speak;
but does it not require all to rescind it?" (IV, 253). Just as Jones may not
permissibly fail to deliver widgets to Smith if Jones had agreed to do so
and Smith has not released him from the contract, the South, so Lincoln
argued, may not permissibly withdraw from the contractual Union unless
the North agreed to release it. In short, even if the United States were a
"mere" contract, unilateral secession would not be permissible.^
A fourth objection (argument #7) to the South's secession was re-
lated. If, for Lincoln, the Union was not a contract, what was it, and,
more importantly, what was the nature of agreement by which the Union
was formed? The answers to these questions were contested. In Lin-
coln's mind the Southem position rested on an "ingenious sophism,"
namely, that "any state of the Union may, consistently with the national
Constitution, and therefore lawfully, and peacefully, withdraw from the
Union, without the consent of the Union, or of any other state" (IV,
433). For Lincoln, the heart of the sophism lay with the assumption that
"there is some omnipotent, and sacred supremacy, pertaining to a State"
(IV, 433). He denied this out of hand: "Our States have neither more, nor
less power, than that reserved to them, in the Union, by the Constitu-
tion—no one of them ever having been a State out of the Union" (IV,
433). The conclusion, which he drew rhetorically, was clear: "Having
never been States, either in substance, or in name, outside of the Union,
whence this magical omnipotence of 'State rights', asserting a claim of
power to lawfully destroy the Union itself?" (IV, 434). The central idea
(argument #6) seems to be that since neither the Confederacy nor its
^Lincoln's understanding of the binding force of contracts is in keeping with Anglo-
American liberal thinking. The paragon example is Locke, who argued that while a po-
litical community could only be formed by a contract, its delegation of power to a gov-
erning body could, if the community were to retain the ability to dissolve that body, only
be in the form of a "trust." See Locke, Second Treatise of Govemment, chap. 13.
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constituent States enjoyed sovereign status prior to their inclusion in the
United States, neither could be in a position to subsequently (re)claim
it.'
The remaining three arguments employ a strategy already suggested
with his concern for the Confederacy's republican credentials, namely,
an emphasis not on the status of the seceding region, but rather on the
consequences of state-breaking. First (argument #8), Lincoln wondered
what economic harm might come to the "plain people," claiming that
"[t]hey understand, without argument, that destroying the government,
which was made by Washington, means no good to them" (IV, 439). The
concern was, of course, with some merit. With the loss of the North's
industrial base, and the reticence of European countries to offer support
to its cause, the South would face very real economic challenges.
A second consequence (argument #9) was related; even if the South's
economy made the transition unscathed, would it use its wealth in a
manner to which it was obligated? As Lincoln explained:
... nothing should ever be implied as law, which leads to unjust, or absurd consequences.
The nation purchased, with money, the countries out of which several of these States
were formed. Is it just that they shall go off without leave, and without refunding? The
nation paid very large sums ... to relieve Florida of the aboriginal tribes. Is it just that she
shall now be off without consait, or without making any return? The nation is now in
debt for money applied to the benefit of these so-called seceding States, in common with
the rest. Is it jtist, either that creditors shall go unpaid, or the remaining State pay the
whole? A part of the present national debt was contracted to pay the old debts of Texas,
Is it just that she shall leave, and pay no part of this herself?,.. Again, if one State may
secede, so may another; and when all shall have seceded, none is left to pay the debts. Is
this quite just to creditors? Did we notify them of this sage view of ours, when we bor-
rowed the money? (IV. 435-36)
Thus, Lincoln objected that the South's secession would allow them to
skip out on their share of the national debt.
Finally (argument #10), there were consequences not just to the
South or North, but to all of humanity. Lincoln expressed this concern
nwst clearly in the Gettysburg Address, when he spoke of the war as
"testing whether that nation, or any nation so conceived and so dedi-
*niis was not the first tinw Lincoln emphasized the temporal issues surrounding
statehood and sovereignty. In attempting to establish the legal status of the Union's per-
petual nature, he argued in the First Inaugural Address that the "Union is much older
than the Constitution" (IV, 253). In fact, he went on, "[I]t was formed ... by the Articles
of Association in 1774 ,,. [and] matured and continued by the Declaration of Independ-
ence in 1776 .,. [and] further matured and expressly declared and pledged, to be perpet-
ual, by the Articles of Confederation in 1778." Dating the Union back prior to the Con-
stitution bolstered his claim that the States could in no way be seen as having enjoyed
sovereign status prior to their inclusion in the United States.
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cated, can long endure." The Union goal, he argued, is thus to insure that
"govemment of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish
from the earth" (VII, 23). As Allen Buchanan records: "Lincoln was
convinced that the fate of democracy in the world depended on the suc-
cess of the American experiment, that if the Union dissolved, political
freedom and all its fmits might 'perish from the earth'."'°
Assessing Lincoln's Arguments
In this section we explain why none of Lincoln's ten arguments is ade-
quate. Reviewing them in the order we introduced them above, let us
begin with what might be dubbed his "Russian Doll" argument (argu-
ntent #1), which purports to establish the impermissibility of all seces-
sion. According to this argument, no right to secede can exist because,
were any secession allowed, there would be no justification for denying
subsequent separatist movements who in tum seek independence from
the newly sovereign states. As it stands, this argument may not appear
very compelling. In general, it does no good to suggest that one can
never permit X on the grounds that permitting X once will lead to many
reiterations of X, unless one also explains why the proliferation of X is
problematic. Imagine, for instance, protesting that we can never allow
anyone to put their pants on one leg at a time because this might lead to
everyone putting their pants on one leg at a time. Since there is obvi-
ously nothing wrong with everyone putting their pants on one leg at a
time, clearly we have no reason to fear the precedent set by the first per-
son doing so. On the other hand, my throwing batteries in the trash—an
action with no measurable environmental cost—might of itself be mor-
ally unproblematic, yet if it could be shown that my example would lead
to widespread battery dumping, then a case could be made against my
lone action. Note, however, that that case rests on the assertion that the
reiteration of the action, not the action itself, is problematic.
In faimess to Lincoln, however, it seems reasonable to constme his
first argument as a slippery-slope argument that includes the (plausible)
implicit premise that the proliferation of state-breaking could be ex-
tremely harmful. In other words, once one starts the secessionist ball
rolling, there would be no stopping it short of anarchy. Thus, we cannot
allow any secessionist rights because doing so would lead to subsequent
reiterations that are clearly harmful.
The first thing to note about Lincoln's blanket denial of the right to
secede is that it saddles him with the awkward conclusion that the
'"Buchanan, Secession, p. 97.
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American Revolution, itself an act of secession, was unjustified. Of
course, Lincoln is not logically barred from claiming that the American
colonists had no right to secede, but we suspect that he would not want
to endorse such a conclusion and thus might refrain from condemning
secession per se.
Even if Lincoln were prepared to condemn George Washington et al.,
there are other problems with his Russian DoU argument. To appreciate
these difficulties, notice that his argument requires two in^licit prem-
ises: (1) unlimited state-breaking would result in unpalatable circum-
stances, and (2) one cannot permit some political divisions without li-
censing all of them. Because we share Lincoln's fear of political insta-
bility, we can accept his first premise. We deny his second premise,
however, because there is nothing to preclude one from distinguishing
iteiWeaar rhomibsv versuJT ihcmitii' sK-isftiiflnr iciu^ alV(all;wiiig~ omy ilhr
latter. If one wants to avoid political instability, then one should prohibit
only those political divorces liable to cause such instability. The key is
that if it is political instability rather than secession that is worrisome,
then one should prohibit only the fonner. Of course, avoiding this insta-
bility might require disallowing some state-breaking, but it does not fol-
low from this that secession can never be permissible. In short, just as
one would not outlaw all driving merely because driving while drunk is
dangerous, we ought not outlaw all state-breaking merely because there
are circumstances in which secession would prove dangerous. Thus, in
the absence of an explanation as to why one could not allow harmless
secessions without also allowing subsequent harmful ones, we deny that
the slope from permitting any secession to anarchic chaos is as slippery
as Lincoln's Russian Doll argument presumes."
"Here a defender of Lincoln might protest that we have over-simplified the matter. In
particular, one might worry that it is not so easy to merely prohibit only those secessions
liable to cause political instability; difficult questions must be answered regarding who
should make this determination and by what criteria. Both because there are bound to be
controversial cases, and because the separatists and the unionists are each interested par-
ties whose impartiality cannot be relied upon, contemporary theorists like Wayne Nor-
man suggest that international bodies be established to adjudicate these disputes accord-
ing to clear and promulgated rules. See Wayne Norman, 'The Ethics of Secession as the
Regulation of Secessionist Pobtics," in Margaret Moore (ed.). National Self-Deter-
mination and Secession (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).
We are receptive to this suggestion, but the fact remains that political leaders like
Lincoln will be forced to make their decisions in an institutional vacuum until such ef-
fective international courts are established. Moreover, becatiae it was clear that the divi-
sion between the North and the South would not have resulted in anarchic chaos, Lincoln
could not invoke such concerns to justify resisting this particular secession. Thus, while
we agree that we should work toward a future in which leaders like Lincoln will not ef-
fectively preside over secessionist conflicts, this does nothing to diminish our concerns
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Lincoln's second general argument (argument #2) was a simple one
involving only two premises: (I) there is no morally relevant difference
between minority and majority secessions, and (2) majority secessions
(otherwise known as "exclusions") are obviously wrong. We resist this
argument because we disagree that all exclusions are necessarily intiper-
missible. We admit that it would be wrong for an overwhelming majority
to exclude a tiny, fragile minority who could not form a viable country
on their own, but what makes this particular case of majority secession
worrisome is not that the majority leaves the minority but that a majority
leaves a group in a perilous circumstance in which it cannot secure po-
litical stability. In short, it is the excluded group's political inviability
rather than its minority status that is worrisome. If this is correct, then
there is nothing wrong with majority secession per se; rather, there is
something problematic only about excluding vulnerable groups.
From this, we can draw two conclusions: First, even if Lincoln were
right (as we think he was) that there is no morally relevant difference
between minority and majority secessions, Lincoln's argument fails for
its reliance upon the false premise that all majority secession is imper-
missible. Second, if Lincoln were to retreat to the more plausible prem-
ise that no party may secede from a politically inviable group, this would
render his argument impotent against the South's bid to secede, because
the North clearly would have been able to perform the requisite political
functions on its own. Thus, while we applaud Lincoln's insight that mi-
nority and majority secessions are not as different as one might initially
suspect, we deny that any blanket rejection of secession follows from
this.
Lincoln's next argument (argument #3) is more restricted; it applies
about Lincoln's first argument.
'^pne mi^ t contest our claim that exclusion is permissible unless it leaves the ex-
cluded group in a politically unviable position. After all, surely people have a right not to
be deprived of citizenship by a vote of othere, no matter whether the result leaves them in
peril or not. We disagree. This is not the place for an extended defense of political self-
determination, but consider the following (vwy quick) response to this objection: As long
as political states remain territorially rather than consensually defined (as they must, if
they are sadsfsctorily to perform the fiinctions that justify their existence), then not eve-
ryone will have complete discretion to choose their compatriots. The more modest goal,
then, must be to give citizens the maximal say in drawing political borders consistent
with maintaining viable, territorially defined states. The way to do this is to allow all and
only those secessions/exclusions that leave the separatists and the divorced party politi-
cally viable. Finally, to those who protest that this would allow a majority to place a mi-
nority in a dispreferred political situation, we counter that rejecting our recommendation
allows a minority to force a majority to remain in a dispreferred political arrangement.
Thus, the concern that we exercise maximal control over our citizenship actually moti-
vates, rather than undermines, our recommendation.
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only to democracies (or, in Lincoln's terms, to republican forms of gov-
ernment). In his view, secession is both incompatible with, and unneces-
sary under, a democracy. It is incompatible with democracy because
voting makes sense only if one presumes that all voters will be bound by
the results, and secession is unnecessary because democracy offers citi-
zens alternative (non-separatist) means of voicing concerns and ex-
pressing preferences.
At an ideal level, this argument is perhaps sound: democracy's pri-
mary virtue is precisely what renders secession unnecessary.'^ Yet if
precluding secession on democratic grounds makes for a sound theoreti-
cal argument, it runs into trouble as a practical doctrine. The most obvi-
ous difficulty is that it demands too much of actual democratic political
institutions, A healthy constitutional democracy should be able to ac-
commodate a vast number of grievances, yet to say that any grievances
that it cannot accommodate are ipso facto illegitimate seems to go too
far. A more plausible position is one that Lincoln himself, in a sarcastic
caricature of his opponents, hinted at:
Prior to my instalation here it bad been inculcated that any State had a lawful right to
secede from the national Union; and that it would be expedient to exercise the right,
whenever the devotees of the doctrine should fail to elect a ftcsident to their own lildng.
I was elected contrary to their lildng; and accordingly, so far as it was legally possible,
they had taken seven states out of the Union. (VI, 263)
Clearly Lincoln was right to suggest that democracy requires accepting
defeat at the polls—one might even say that democracy is defined by the
losers' continued embrace of the system.'"* Getting a president "contrary
to [one's] liking" is an acceptable, if perhaps regrettable, democratic
outcome, and thus to demand secession on such a whim ("we don't like
the president") does imply a lack of respect and understanding for le-
gitimate democratic institutions.
In pointing this out, however, Lincoln was implicitly acknowledging
the more reasonable position that democracy does not preclude seces-
the apparent contradiction of recognizing the right of revolution while reject-
ing the seemingly less drastic right of secession can be squared: as a threat designed to
insure the leaders' accountabibty to the people, revolution, it might he argued, preserves
a nation's republican ideal; secession, on the other hand, ensures only its abandonment.
'*While Lincoln might not agree with Rousseau that "when ... the opinion contrary
to mine prevails, this proves merely that I was in error" (The Social Contract, reprinted in
The Basic Political Writings (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1987), p. 206), he would,
however, insist on proving correct Tocqueville's assessment that "every American feels a
sort of personal interest in obeying the laws, for a man who is not today one of the ma-
jority party may be so tomorrow" (Democracy in America (New York; Harper Perennial,
1988), p. 240).
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sion, it simply raises the bar (substantially) for its acceptance.'^ To point
out that it is unreasonable to secede on whim is to suggest that it may be
reasonable if the grounds refiect neither bad faith nor frivolity. Put oth-
erwise, it is the whim that is the problem, not the demand for secession.
Hence we would argue that there are limits to the ability of republican
institutions to accommodate secessionist concems (i.e., to keep the
country together). When those limits are reached, it does not of necessity
signal that the demands are illegitimate, for, in the real worid of democ-
racy, it could just as reasonably suggest that the institutional mecha-
nisms of accommodation have broken down. In fact, secession might
help democratic theory solve the otherwise intractable problem of per-
sistent minorities. (In cases other than permanent minorities, determining
whether secession or revolution is the more appropriate response would
require further infonnation.)
If our reasoning to this point has been on target, then Lincoln was
wrong to suggest either that secession must always be impermissible or
that political divorce from democracies can never be legitimate. The ar-
guments on which Lincoln placed the greatest emphasis, however, were
those directed specifically against the South's claim to independence,
and it is toward these seven arguments that we now tum.
Lincoln's first objection to the South's separatist movement (argu-
ment #4) was that it lacked popular support. On his view, the Confeder-
acy's Declaration of Independence was the initiative of an elite few who
lacked democratic authorization and whose views were unrepresentative
of the wishes of most Southemers. We would take this argument very
seriously if we were convinced of the accuracy of this descriptive claim,
but we lack Lincoln's conviction that the majority of Southemers pre-
ferred to remain in the Union. Lincoln correctly notes that not every
State had a free plebiscite on the matter, but, given the nature of political
representation at the time, we are unimpressed with this fact. It might
strike some as awkward that we contextualize the need for plebiscites,
but consider the American Revolution and the division of the former
Czechoslovakia into the Czech Republic and Slovakia: in neither in-
stance was a free plebiscite held on the issue of political divorce. In the
case of the American Revolution, it strikes us as objectionably anachro-
nistic to condemn the colonists for not having taken a plebiscite. Let us
be clear here: we agree that political elites ought not to have started the
war if they knew that the majority of their fellow colonists preferred to
maintain their affiliation with Britain, but it does not follow from this
Buchanan discusses this idea that "a right to secede undermines constitutional de-
nwcracy" in some detail. See Secession, pp. 98-99.
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that these same elites should not have declared independence without
first polling those they sougjit to represent. In the case of Czechoslova-
kia, on the other hand, it seems right to question why no plebiscite was
held. Because the denwcratic institutions and technological machinery
necessary to perform the plebiscite were readily available in the latter
case, it does not seem too much to demand. Thus, we are not suggesting
that the people's preferences are morally insignificant; rather, we are
making the less contentious descriptive claim that the mere absence of a
free plebiscite in the Confederate case does not necessarily imply a lack
of popular will. Given the standards of political representation at the
time, it strikes us that the general behavior of Southerners is the best in-
dication of their preferences, and we take their willingness to engage in
such a horrendously long and costly war as at least prima facie evidence
that there was ample popular interest in independence.
Lincoln's second concern about the South's separatist movement (ar-
gument #5) was that its subsequent sovereign state would not be republi-
can. We agree with what must be seen as the general principle here: a
group has no right to secede to form a substantially less just state than
the one in which it cunently resides. Our only question is whether such
an argument applies to the Southern case. Lincoln inferred the injustice
of the Confederacy from two observations: (1) the secession was not
popularly supported in the South, and (2) the Confederate's Declaration
of Independence included neither the phrase "all men are created equal"
nor "We, the People" (instead it substituted "We the deputies of the sov-
ereign and independent States"). While a seceded South may indeed
have presented a shaky moral vision (by contemporary standards espe-
cially), we nonetheless find neither of Lincoln's inferences of injustice
sound.
Having just addressed (1) above, we need only explain our doubts
about (2). Lincoln alleged that the substitution of "We the deputies of
the sovereign and independent States" for "We, the People" signaled a
departure from Republican principles. In our view, however, a more
plausible interpretation of this substitution is that it is an attempt to
claim the status thought necessary to demand independence. That is, the
South sought to emphasize their standing as sovereign and independent
states to buttress their moral claim to political self-determination, not to
signal their reluctance to govern denKx;ratically. Whether or not our
reading of the Confederate's Declaration of Independence is more accu-
rate is, in the end, a question best left to nrore qualified historians. What
is paranwunt here is simply that speculations about the South's political
future drawn from questionable textual interpretation hardly constitute
the sort of empirical support necessary for rejecting secession on justice
126 Peter Lindsay and Christopher Heath Wellman
grounds.
On the other hand, if Lincoln had objected to the South's intention to
create a state that condoned slavery, then (as we will emphasize below)
he would have been on solid footing in resisting their creation of an ob-
jectionably unjust state. Of course, Lincoln explicitly refused to criticize
the Confederacy on these grounds.'^ Thus, although Lincoln was right to
insist that the South should not be permitted to form a substantially less
just govemment, we take the contestable textual evidence he offered to
support his claim to be insufficient and, as a consequence, we reject his
version of this argument.
Lincoln's third argument against the South's right to secede (argu-
ment #6) was that if the Union were merely a contract (which he did not
believe), then the South would be contractually obligated to remain in it.
The argument rests on two claims, one historical and one philosophical,
The historical claim is that if it were a contract, there is substantial legal
precedent to show that it would have entailed a perpetual Union. The
philosophical claim is that, given the nature of contracts, the Southern
secession would thereby be ruled out.
We may, in arguing against Lincoln, grant him the historical claim:
let us presunr»e that the Union was formed by a contract purporting to
bind all parties in perpetuity. Does it follow from that fact that the par-
ties would be thus bound? Does the philosophical claim hold? For two
reasons we argue that it does not. First, even if we grant arguendo that
the representatives were capable of binding all of their constituents at
the time, it is problematic to suppose that future generations can be
bound by an agreement made by their forebears.'^ As Rousseau ob-
served: "Even if each person can alienate himself, he cannot alienate his
children.""^ We take this point to be commonsensical: if Allaine's
grandmother promised someone in her church that Allaine would be-
come a monk, for instance, no one would think that she has a moral duty
"This may be an instance in which Lincoln's political position and ntotives inhibited
him from making a more philosophically sound argument. We cannot make the case here,
but it does not seem unreasonable to speculate that Lincoln believed that the South's
perpetuation of slavery should count against its claim to sovereignty. If so, perhaps Lin-
coln eschewed this (clearly nwre compelling) objection only because it was politically
inexpedient,
"One might resist our contention that future generations cannot be bound by their
forebears on the grounds that this would seem to undermine the very idea of a constitu-
tion. In response, consider two points: First, we mean to suggest only that future genera-
tions cannot be morally, as opposed to legally, bound. Second, even legal constitutions
typically provide means for fiiture generations to amend them, so that future citizens need
not be bound by their ancestors' vision.
'^Jean Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, p. 144,
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to do so.^ ^
Moreover, even if the Southerners could inherit political obligations
from a contract entered into generations earlier, we must not assun»e
without argument that the obligation would be to remain in the Union; it
seems more plausible to suppose that they had only the more modest re-
sponsibility to secede in a fair fashion. In support of this, notice what
obligations we ascribe to married individuals. Even though the contract
between spouses is much less problematic (insofar as it is explicit, con-
sensual, and personal rather than intergenerational), we still do not insist
that couples must stay together as promised; instead, we claim only that
they are obligated to divorce under certain terms. (We insist that their
collective assets be divided fairly, for instance, and we sometimes make
special arrangements for the provision of children and/or continued
transfers.) Along these same lines, and because the marriage contract
seems a nwre apt basis of comparison than a commercial contract, it
strikes us that whatever residual obligation the South had to the larger
Union would require them only to secede under fair terms (by agreeing
to pay a fair portion of the national debt, for instance), rather than to re-
main in the political union indefinitely.
Lincoln's fourth concern (argument #7) was that the Confederacy
(and/or the seceding States) lacked the proper pre-Union status. He in-
sisted that because the Southern States were not sovereign political units
prior to the formation of the United States, they had no right to withdraw
from the Union. In our view, this is among the weakest of Lincoln's ar-
guments. We recognize that there was considerable controversy at the
time regarding the pre-Union status of the Southern States, but we think
that this entire issue can be safely side-stepped, since it is in:q)lausible to
suppose that only previously autononx>us regions can qualify for the
right to secede.^ For instance, do we really want to deny the Kurds a
'^ Of course, one mi^ t object that there is a morally relevant difference between the
person to whom my grandmother made a promise and our political partners, because the
latter have reasonable expectations of continued cooperation based upon the nearly one
hundred years of cooperation. This difference may indeed be morally relevant, but if so,
it indicates that whatever political duties the South had to the Union were based on this
ongoing cooperation rather than merely some contract purportedly entered into in either
1776 or 1789. As space does not permit it, we leave aside the issue of tacit consent and
its power—an issue raised in response to anti-social contract thinkers dating at least as far
back as Filmer. We mention only the fact that neither supporters nor critics of social
contract thinking would presume that contracts bind all future generations.
'^*More troubling still is what the argument implies as a theory of legitimacy. To say
that prior sovereignty is the sine qua non of secessionist claims is to say that social bonds
not rooted in political history are, in spite of any other virtues they may manifest, some-
how inadequate for the establishment of the right to self-government. Yet it is difficult to
see how a region's prior political history has any moral standing with respect to the issue
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right to secede from Iraq on these grounds? In light of the fact that po-
litical boundaries are so often the result of fraud, force, and historical
contingencies, it seems wrong to place so much moral weight on a
party's political pedigree. Given that so many Southerners at the time
were arguing that their right to secede stemmed from the nature of the
agreement into which these States had entered, it is understandable that
Lincoln would have been attracted to this position; the problem is that he
offers no decent argument to support his counterintuitive premise that
only previously autonomous units could claim the right to sovereignty.
Finally, notice that the original Thirteen Colonies clearly lacked this
status vis-a-vis Britain, so even if Lincoln could manufacture the requi-
site arguments on this issue, it would leave him with the awkward impli-
cation that the United States had no right to its own independence.
Lincoln's fifth argument against the political division (argument #8)
was that individuals in the South would suffer economically. In our
view, this argument too can be rejected even if its principal descriptive
claim is true. That is to say, even if Lincoln were right that the South's
economy would do less well on its own, it seems that the Southerners
should have enjoyed the moral dominion to decide whether the benefits
of independence were worth the economic costs.^' By analogy, the
authors of this article would likely earn considerably more as investment
brokers than as professors, but no one would claim that we are therefore
obligated to leave our posts at the university in order to maximize our
economic prospects. It is up to us to decide how important financial suc-
cess is, and—regardless of whether others think we are wise to forgo the
economic opportunities that we do—it is our right to make these choices.
(By the same token, it is not surprising that few objected to the political
division of the former Czechoslovakia even though it was widely taken
for granted that newly sovereign Slovak Republic would subsequently
suffer economically.) Thus, whether or not Lincoln's economic predic-
tions were on target, we are unmoved by this argument.^^
of sovereignty (except perhaps as a second order factor in determining, say, a region's
protective capabilities or its cultural cohesion). If political history were relevant to the
degree that consent, common heritage/language, or ability to protect its citizens arguably
arc, it would preclude not just the secession of certain regions within a state, but also the
formation of states wilh no prior history of statehood.
^'Again, we are leaving slavery out of the economic calculus.
^ ^ e r e is a more sophisticated version of this argument that would be more compel-
ling, but we reject it for its reliance on an implausible descriptive premise. Specifically,
one might suggest that, while no one has a right that her country be maximally politically
efficient, each of us has a right to a decent minimum. If one combines this claim with the
observation that—unlike an individual choosing her own profession—state-breaking
raises moral issues insofar as it inevitably includes unwilling constituents who would
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Lincoln's sixth argument in favor of forcibly preserving the Union
(argument #9) was his fear that the South would default on its debts to
the North after the secession. In particular, Lincoln expressed concern
about the South not paying its fair share of the national debt, much of
which was assumed when the United States purchased portions of the
Southern territory. We agree that it would be permissible to hold the
South responsible for its portion of the country's expenses, but we deny
that this undermines their right to secede. In our view, the Confederacy's
secession is consistent with their paying their portion of the national
bills, just as marital divorce is compatible with each of the individuals
exiting with a fair share of the couple's assets and debts. Thus, if Lin-
coln were genuinely concerned about only the national debt, the appro-
priate thing for him to do would have been to demand that the South
could secede only on the condition that it leave with its portion of the
overall debt. Of course, Lincohi might object to this proposal on the
grounds that there would be little the North could do to ensure that the
South honor this debt after the separation. (After all, there is an impor-
tant disanalogy between marital and political divorces in that the former
occur under the supervision of legal systems that can enforce the terms
of separation, but there is no comparably powerful institution of interna-
tional law to ensure that political states honor their exit agreements.) If
Lincoln's worries were legitimate, then he would have been justified in
insisting that the secession be incremental or provisional until the debt
was paid off (or, at the very most, he might have suggested that the se-
cession be delayed until the South had either paid its debt or, more rea-
sonably, given sufficient collateral or assurances that it would do so).
But none of this is sufficient to establish that the South's secession was
illegitimate simpliciter, rather, these considerations imply only that Lin-
coln might have permissibly placed conditions on the Confederacy's
separation.
Finally, we come to the argument that apparently played the biggest
role in nwtivating Lincoln to resist the secession (argument #10), his
desire to fulfill what has been called the "Great American Experiment."
Few of us would be indifferent to having our countries partitioned, so it
is more than understandable that Lincoln would be so uncomfortable
with the United States splitting in two on his watch. In Lincoln's view,
however, there was even more at stake in the case of preserving the
prefer to remain in the existing Union, one could plausibly suggest that secession is im-
permissible whenever it would cause such economic deprivation that unwilling individu-
als would have to endure extreme economic hardship. We do not worry eixmt this more
sophisticated variation on Lincoln's argument, thouj^, because we deny that the South's
independence would have such a profound detrimental effect upon its economy.
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United States, for he believed that America's republican form of gov-
ernment was a model for the future. Hence his obligation to do whatever
was necessary to keep the country intact was not just to future citizens,
but to all of humankind.
Insofar as we are fans of constitutional democracy who (with some
reservations) are happy that the United States has served as an influential
model of how governments should order themselves, we are not without
sympathy for this argument. The problem is that it is not clear to us why
the remaining Northern States could not have equally supplied the world
with such a paradigm after the political division. (Indeed, some think
that, unencumbered by the South, the remaining States would have en-
joyed even more economic, political, and moral success.) Thus, unless
there is some reason to believe that the rump state would have foun-
dered, it appears that an alternative "Great American Experiment" could
have continued without the South, and, as a consequence, the value of
preserving a model govemment did not justify forcibly resisting the se-
cession.
Moreover, even if we concede for the sake of argument that neither
of the two post-secession countries would have provided a suitable
model of govemment, there remain additional problems with this argu-
ment. The chief difficulty is that it is impermissible to treat the Ante-
bellum Southerners merely as a means to creating a greater good for fu-
ture generations. To see this, consider the pyramids: regardless of how
happy we may be that these tremendously impressive structures were
constructed, their magnificence cannot justify the institution of slavery
used to build them. Or, put in more contemporary terms, no matter how
confident we may be that humanity into the indefinite future would ap-
preciate our completing, say, a huge space station for scientific explora-
tion, these expected returns would not justify our using slave labor even
if the latter were necessary to finish this project. For the sante reasons,
Lincoln could not permissibly limit the Southerners' political self-
determination if his only justification for doing so was that it was nece.s-
sary to secure dividends for future generations.
At this point one might protest that it is inappropriate to compare pre-
serving democracy to building pyramids because the latter is so much
less significant. Whereas the pyramids supply little more than aesthetic
value, the importance of political arrangements is in an entirely different
league both because they have such a profound affect upon those living
under them and because they can be replicated in a manner that allows
an unlimited number to benefit. For two reasons, we resist this response.
First, world-historical significance is not established by a claim alone,
but rather stands in need of a rational argument. The twentieth century
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had far too many exan^les of leaders who thought the contrary, and who
did so to devastating effect. Indeed, it is difficult to think of a terrorist or
totalitarian leader who could not defend treating humans merely as a
means if permitted to do so in the name of the some putative benefit to
humanity.
Second, there is something ironic about denying the South's political
self-determination in the name of a republican form of government, be-
cause the principal virtue of, and justification for, deniocracy is its
maximal promotion of political self-determination. Indeed, it is striking
that not only have defenders of secession like David Copp and Daniel
Philpott argued that the best defense of state-breaking grounded in self-
determination is to be found in denKx:ratic theory,^ but arch defenders
of democracy like Robert Dahl have independently concluded that seces-
sion is "perfectly consistent with democratic practice."^* Thus, insofar as
the very principles that demand that important social decisions be
reached democratically also justi^ secession grounded in self-deter-
mination, it is more than a little awkward to deny the latter in the name
of the former. We conclude, therefore, that the "Great American Ex-
periment" no more justified Lincoln's denial of the South's exercise of
political self-determination than it would justify Canada's forcibly an-
nexing the United States in its effort to conduct a "Great NORTH
American Experiment."
In the end, then, our response to Lincoln's arguments is reminiscent
of Dax Cowan's attitude toward those who denied his right to die.
Cowart was the victim of an explosion that killed his father and left him
blind and horribly burned all over his body. The treatments he endured
for his bums were so torturous that he decided that the remainder of his
life was clearly not worth these twice-a-day procedures (which involved
peeling the bandages off his skinless body, scraping away any poten-
tially infectious material, and lowering him into a tub of liquid that was
tantamount to acid). When he told the hospital staff of his desire to die,
they ignored his wishes and removed the phone from his room so that he
could not call a lawyer. Now, years after his recovery, Cowart is happy
to be alive. Still, he insists that (1) he had a right to die, (2) the n^edical
"See David Copp, "Democracy and Communal Self-Deaermination," in Robert
McKim and Jeff McMahan (eds.). The Morality of Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1997), pp. 277-300; and Daniel Philpott, "In Defense of Self-Determination,"
Ethics 105 (1995): 352-85. and "Self-Detennination in Practice," in National Self-
Determination and Secession, pp. 79-102. Allen Buchanan criticizes both authors in his
article, "Detnocracy and Secession," in National Self-Determination and Secession, pp.
14-33.
^*Robert Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989),
p. 196.
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practitioners acted impermissibly in disrespecting his self-determination,
(3) if faced with the choice again, he would again choose to die rather
than face the horrific treatment, and finally, (4) though they acted
wrongly, Cowart understands that the hospital staff meant well and acted
with noble intentions. Similarly, despite the fact that we are happy that
the Union was preserved, we believe that (1) none of Lincoln's argu-
ments justified his denying the South's political self-determination, (2) if
faced with a Southern secessionist movenrient today, the North would
have no right to deny their independence, and finally, (3) though his ^ -
guments were poor, Lincoln acted with noble intentions.
An Alternative Argument Against Southern Secession
Although we reject each of Lincoln's ten arguments, we believe neither
that the South had a right to secede nor that Lincoln acted impermissibly
in forcibly resisting its secession. In this section we first explain why the
South had no right to secede and then comment on a common defect
characteristic of the arguments Lincoln posits as well as those he omits.
In brief, we think the South's bid to secede was disqualified by its
interest in preserving the institution of slavery. Because we appreciate
the value of self-determination, we do not insist that a group must have
been treated unjustly to qualify for a right to secede. In our view, for in-
stance, the merits of the American Colonies' case for divorce from Brit-
ain did not depend upon the strength of their claims to have been vic-
timized by an unfair system of taxation without representation: they need
only have cited their desire to form their own country. Insofar as we
share Lincoln's concern about the dangers of political instability, how-
ever, we restrict the right to secede to only those parties able and willing
to form a state at least as just as the one from which they seek to se-
cede.^ Of course, national debts and other issues might explain why
various conditions may legitimately be placed on any given political di-
vorce, but, as we explained above, this does not establish the impermis-
^^ We also insist that the rump state not be left unable to perform the requisite politi-
cal functions. Because of our focus on Lincoln, we will not here defend these strikingly
permissive views on unilateral state-breaking. Readers interested in a such a defense are
encouraged to see Christopher H. Weliman, "A Defense of Secession and Political Self-
Determination," Philosophy & Public Affairs 24 {1995): 142-71. We should also specify
that we understand a right to secede to include a moral liberty to separate and a moral
claim that the namp state (as well as third parties) not forcibly resist the divorce. For the
purposes of this paper, we do not assume that the remainder state (or any other party in
the international community) has a duty to officially recognize or otherwise assist chc
seceding state.
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sibility of secession any more than the analogous restrictions on marital
divisions preclude couples from divorcing.
Applying this reasoning to the South, we think that their capacity to
perform the requisite political functions qualified them for a right to in-
dependence as long as they were willing to do so in a just manner. As we
have seen, Lincoln doubted that they had that edacity (argument #5),
thereby demonstrating his acceptance of what we consider the relevant
general principle. His mistake, in our assessment, was in not applying
that principle against the institution that discredited the South's claim to
legitimacy more than any other. Insofar as Southern leaders sought to
continue slavery, any professed intention to form a state at least as just
as the Union, and thus any right of secession, may be soundly rejected.
Before moving on, it is important to spell out the conditional nature
of this argun>ent. Specifically, we submit that Lincoln was justified in
forcibly resisting the separatist movement if this was the only way to end
slavery. Taking seriously the hypothetical nature of this conclusion re-
veals that this justification did not give Lincoln license to fight the se-
cession no matter what; it authorized him only to place a condition on
the political divorce. In particular, since Lincoln's only legitimate griev-
ance with the secession was that the subsequent sovereign state would be
unjust, Lincoln should have extended the Southern States the following
offer: "If you agree to permanently abolish slavery, then I will not con-
test your leaving, ff you plan to maintain slavery, on the other hand, then
you leave me no choice but to forcibly resist the secession so that I can
eradicate that unjust institution." In the end, then, our position is that
Lincoln might have had a right to deny the South's bid for independence,
but, because he would be justified in doing so only if it were necessary
to end slavery, he was required fu^t to offer the South the option of se-
ceding without slavery. In short, since it was the slavery rather than the
secession to which Lincoln could righteously object, this justification
permitted him only in placing a condition on the terms of the political
divorce. However, because the Southern States were adamant about
maintaining slavery, this condition, unlike those discussed above, is piv-
otal.
The preceding analysis highlights that there are two distinct issues:
the eradication of slavery and the preservation of the Union. It is striking
that Lincoln explicitly recognized that these two concerns were separa-
ble and thus posed distinct questions. When discussing the issue of slav-
ery, Lincoln explained:
My paramount object in this struggle is to save the Union, and is not either to save or to
destroy slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing any slave I would do it, and if I
could save it by freeing all the slaves I would do it; and if I could save the Union by
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freeing some and leaving others alone 1 would also do that. What I do about slavery, and
the colored race. I do because I believe it helps to save the Union. (V, 388)
But, while Lincoln is to be applauded for distinguishing between the
separate issues of slavery and secession, we reject his position on each
of the two distinct matters. Whereas Lincoln asserted that (I) the South
had no right to secede, (2) continuing the practice of slavery was, if ex-
pedient, an acceptable option, and (3) the correct stance to take regard-
ing slavery was determined by the more important issue of preserving
the Union; we would submit that (lA) the South had a r i ^ t to secede if
they would abolish slavery, (2A) under no circumstances was slavery an
acceptable option, and {3A) the only justification for denying the
South's political self-determination was as a necessary nieans to elimi-
nating the (more important) institution of slavery, hi fact, we believe that
slavery is such a grave injustice that it not only placed Lincoln at liberty
to do what was necessary to extinguish it, it obligated him to do so. As a
result, not only do we contend that Lincoln would have been justified in
denying the South's independence if this were the only way to eradicate
slavery, we assert that, if the North had wanted to secede from the South,
the North would have been obligated to remain in the Union if this were
the only way to put an end to slavery. Thus (as should be clear from our
claim that the importance of eliminating slavery would also trump the
North's political self-determination), our stance does not stem from a
failure to respect the autonomy of the South; it is rather because we in-
sist that the South's unjust institutions disqualified their claim to self-
determination.
Before concluding, it is worth noting that our criticism of Lincoln's
position on the South's independence and our criticism of his stance on
slavery both stem from a dissatisfaction with the value he places on self-
determination, h) the case of the political divorce, Lincoln's arguments
insufficiently appreciate the South's right to political self-determination,
and regarding slavery, he failed to respect the slaves' rights to personal
self-determination. Thus, while he might have had a general regard for
the importance of autonomy, he did not recognize key parties (i.e.. Black
slaves and non-sovereign groups) who have moral rights to self-deter-
mination. In the end, then, his ten arguments against the South's bid for
independence all fail for their incompatibility with the South's moral
dominion over its own affairs, and he failed to make the one argument
against the political divorce that we believe would have been compelling
because he did not appreciate the importance of a slave's right to self-
determination.
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Conclusion
In closing, we want to emphasize that our criticism is directed exclu-
sively toward Lincoln's arguments, not Lincoln as a person or statesper-
son. Without retreating from our objection that Lincoln's argunwnts
consistently give insufficient weight to the value of self-determination,
we appreciate that his cultural era and political position placed enormous
constraints on what he might reasonably be expected to believe, much
less publicly endorse. Thus, our relatively low estimation of his stated
arguments against the South* s bid to secede in no way dampens our pro-
found admiration of Lincoln as a statesperson. In short, nothing in this
essay is meant to deny that the United States was exceedingly fortunate
to have such an extraordinarily wise, virtuous, and politically savvy
leader at the helm during its greatest crisis. To repeat a point niade at the
outset, Lincoln's handling of the secession issue may be the greatest
possible evidence that philosophy and political rule are best left un-
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